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RECENT CA SES
Faulty fire-retardant plywood continues to cause
homeowners headaches
by Allison E. Cahill
In Morris v. Osmose Wood
Preserving, 667 A.2d 624 (Md.
1995), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that manufacturers of
allegedly defective plywood used in
the construction of townhome roofs
may not be held liable to home
buyers for the cost of replacing the
roofs. The Maryland court dismissed
all of the plaintiffs' complaints
because (1) recovery for purely
economic loss is only permitted in
limited warranty actions; (2) the
plaintiffs did not fall within the
definition of "buyers" under
Maryland's Consumer Protection
Act; and (3) implied warranties for
new home sales are not enforced
against manufacturers of construc-
tion materials under Maryland's
version of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC").
Treated plywood may
prematurely deteriorate
In the last decade, many builders
used fire retardant plywood ("FRT
plywood") in new construction to
meet building codes. FRT plywood
is treated with chemicals intended to
retard the spread of flames in a fire.
However, in 1986 it was discovered
that FRT plywood may deteriorate
prematurely when the fire retardant
chemicals become active at 130 to
140 degrees Fahrenheit, instead of
the targeted 180 degrees. Roofs
routinely reach temperatures around
130 degrees Fahrenheit without fire
when outdoor temperatures and
humidity levels are high, which is
common in the southern, southeast-
ern, and eastern portions of the
United States.
Deteriorating plywood may
darken in color and produce a white
dust on its surface. This change is
usually apparent from inside the
attic. This is the chemical reaction
that is intended to retard the spread
of fire when exposed to intense heat.
The National Association of
Home Builders estimates that up to
one million homes have been
affected in the eastern United States.
The New York Times reported that
as of November 6, 1994, it would
cost approximately 48 million
dollars to repair an estimated 34,000
affected roofs.
Since the problem was first
discovered, builders and
homeowners have filed thousands of
lawsuits. Developers have spent
millions of dollars replacing
defective roofs, and courts have
attempted to allocate responsibility.
Many observers compare the legal
furor surrounding FRT plywood to
the seemingly unending stream of
asbestos litigation.
Maryland courts deny
recovery
The plaintiffs in Maryland
initiated a class action suit against
the FRT plywood manufacturers as a
class action. All of the plaintiffs'
townhomes included roofs con-
structed of FRT plywood. The
plaintiffs alleged that the premature
deterioration of the FRT plywood
made their roofs "unsafe and
dangerous" The plaintiff class
claimed that the deteriorated
plywood could collapse under any
weight, even a heavy snowfall.
The circuit court dismissed all
five counts brought by the plaintiff
class. The counts included (1) strict
liability; (2) negligence; (3) breach
of implied warranties; (4) negligent
misrepresentation; and (5) violations
of the Maryland Consumer Protec-
tion Act ("Act") § 13-101-13-411.
The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of all but one
of the counts. The appellate court
reversed the dismissal of the breach
of implied warranty count because
two of the plaintiffs' class members
fell within the statute of limitations
period and provided sufficient facts
to toll the statute of limitations
based on fraudulent concealment.
Court found no risk of
serious physical injury
The Maryland Court of Appeals
began its examination of the class
action by reviewing the bias of
recovery for purely economic loss in
warranty actions. In Maryland,
economic loss recovery in products
liability cases is limited to situations
where both an examination of the
nature of possible damage and the
probability of damage occurring are
serious. The court used a sliding
scale analysis to make this determi-
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nation; for example, if the probabil-
ity of injury is extremely severe, the
possibility of injury need not be as
high. Maryland courts allow
recovery for economic loss in
instances meeting both criteria in
order to encourage the correction of
physically dangerous conditions.
This plaintiff class did not allege
any physical injuries resulting from
the deteriorating FRT plywood.
None of the plaintiffs' roofs col-
lapsed due to heavy snow or any
other weather conditions. Therefore,
the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals held that the possibility of
injury did not establish an "existence
of a clear danger of death or serious
personal injury" in this case.
The appellate court then exam-
ined the plaintiffs' claims under the
Act. The Act defines "consumer
goods" as those "which are prima-
rily for personal, household, family,
or agricultural purposes" The
plaintiffs argued that the Maryland
Act's definition is more general than
the UCC's definition of "consumer
goods" and that the Maryland Act's
definition provides for recovery
because the manufacturers sold the
plywood to builders intending that
the FRT plywood would be used in
residential townhomes. In addition,
the plaintiffs argued that the broad
language in the Act permitts
recovery even though the home
buyers (lid not specifically rely on
statements made by the manufactur-
ers when the plywood was sold to
the home builders.
However, the defendant manufac-
turers argued that the plaintiffs did
not rely on statements made by the
manufacturers; thus, the alleged
unfair practices were not related to
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any sale of consumer goods to the
home buyers. The appellate court
agreed, holding that the deceptive
practices alleged by the plaintiffs
occurred during the marketing of the
plywood to the builders, not to the
home buyers. The court reasoned
that any effect on consumers from
representations made to the builders
was tenuous and not sufficient to
hold the manufacturers liable to the
home buyers.
The plaintiffs also proved
unsuccessful in their claim under
Maryland's version of the UCC. The
plaintiffs alleged that the statute of
limitations tolled because the
manufacturers fraudulently con-
cealed information about the
probability that FRT plywood would
prematurely deteriorate. However,
the appellate court disagreed
because the homeowners did not fall
within the definition of "buyers."
Therefore, the court could not
determine whether the statute of
limitations had run because the dates
of the plywood sales were not
included in the record. The record
only included the dates when the
homeowners bought the townhomes.
Following this analysis, the
appellate court also held that the
plaintiffs lacked vertical privity
under Maryland's version of the
UCC. Vertical privity is still
required for claims brought by non-
buyers under Maryland's UCC.
However, the homeowners never
"bought" plywood. Under § 2-105,
"goods" must be movable at the
time of sale. Again, the court held
that the sale of goods occurred when
the builders bought the FRT
plywood, not when the home buyers
purchased the townhomes. Once the
builders used the FRT plywood for
the townhomes, the "goods" became
permanently attached to the
townhomes and no longer "mov-
able" This precluded the plaintiffs'
ability to recover under Maryland's
UCC.
Finally, the appellate court held
that the plaintiffs could not recover
from the manufacturers under an
implied warranty theory for new
home sales because only builders
and real estate brokers may give
new home warranties. The court
concluded that manufacturers may
not give these warranties. Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the dis-
missal of the UCC warranty claims.
Dissent would allow
recovery under Maryland's
Consumer Protection Act
According to Justice Elridge,
with whom two other justices
agreed, the appellate court departed
from Maryland's precedent by
failing to view the plaintiffs'
assertions in a light most favorable
to them. The dissent argued that
precedent showed that no actual
injury needed to occur to have a
sufficient cause of action.
The dissent explained that
homeowners or their agents occa-
sionally need to walk on their roofs
for maintenance reasons, which may
have resulted in physical injury if
the plaintiffs' assertions about the
FRT plywood were viewed favor-
ably. The dissent argued that the
majority held that if no one had been
injured from the alleged faulty
product, the probability of future
injury would be slight. The dissent
believed that the majority's standard
altered the test for economic loss.
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New Jersey provides
money to homeowners for
repairs
New Jersey took an alternative
approach to the FRT plywood
controversy by helping to finance
roof repairs for affected home-
owners. In 1991, the New Jersey
General Assembly responded to
public complaints and created a $54
million New Home Warranty
Security Fund by imposing fees on
builders in the state. Builders are
now required to insure all new
homes for ten years by enrolling in
warranty plans financed through the
new fee. In addition to FRT plywood
claims, the Home Warranty Security
Fund will cover all repairs to newly
constructed homes within the ten
year time period.
Manufacturer's design of bakery equipment not
unreasonably dangerous
by Joanne T. Hannaway
In Ferguson v. FR. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG, 79
E3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, holding that a corporate manufacturer is not
strictly liable for injuries caused by its machinery where
the machine was not sold in an unreasonably dangerous
condition and included warnings alerting persons to the
dangers of misuse.
Bakery modifies machinery
In 1975, Ottenburg Bakery ("the bakery") purchased
a string-line proofer ("proofer") from appellant Winkler
GMBH & Co. KG ("Winkler"), a corporate manufac-
turer of bakery line equipment. A proofer transports
dough through the bakery production line. This piece of
equipment features a removable panel providing limited
access for maintenance purposes. Because the proofer's
moving parts create a risk of danger, Winkler provided
warnings in both the instruction manual and on the
machine itself, cautioning users to refrain from reaching
inside the machinery while in motion.
The bakery discovered that, from time to time, dough
became clogged in the machine. However, the bakery
discouraged its employees from shutting down the
production line. Subsequently, the bakery replaced one
of the proofer's exterior panels with a hinged, plexiglass
door. This hinged door allowed, and arguably, encour-
aged employees to reach into the machine to clear
clogged dough while the machine remained in motion.
Appellee Bernie Ferguson ("Ferguson") became
permanently disabled while reaching into the proofer to
remove dough. Ferguson brought suit against Winkler,
alleging that the proofer was unreasonably dangerous
because of a design defect and that Winkler failed to
warn of such danger. The district court found for
Ferguson, and Winkler appealed.
Winkler's proofer not defective in design
In order to determine whether Winkler was strictly
liable for Ferguson's injury, the court applied the test
adopted in Warner v. Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston,
654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995) which held that a
manufacturer is strictly liable for a design defect if the
product is sold in a defective condition which is unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user. Id. Thus, the court held
that Winkler was not liable to Ferguson.
The court determined that the proofer did not create a
foreseeable likelihood that employees would reach into
the machine at the time the proofer left Winkler's
control. Although the court opined that a safety device
may have reduced the risk of injury to those who reach
inside the proofer, it held that the proofer's design did
not intend for operators to reach inside the machine.
Hence, an unreasonable risk that workers engaged in
standard operation would reach into the moving proofer
did not exist. The court noted the presence of a warning
reminding users to turn the machine off before cleaning,
etc. In addition, the court found that Winkler could not
have foreseen the misuse of the proofer of the nature
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